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THE MODERN LAW OF CHARITIES AS -DE-
RIVED FROM THE STATUTE OF
CHARITABLE USES.
The best definition of a legal charity would seem to be
that given by Gray, J., in Jackson v. Phillips : I " A charity,
in the legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift, to be
applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an
indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds
or hearts under the influence of education or religion, by
relieving their bodies from disease, suffering, or constraint,
by assisting them to establish themselves in life, or by erect-
ing or maintaining public buildings or works, or otherwise
lessening the burdens of government. It is immate- al
whether the purpose is called charitable in the gift itself, if it
is so described as to show that it is charitable in its nature."
Horace Binney, in Vidal v. Girard's Executors,2 defined
a14 Allen, 556. 92 How. (U. S.) 127.
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a legal charity as "whatever is given for the love of God
or the love of your neighbor, in the catholic and universal
sense; given from these motives and to these ends; free
from the stain or taint of every consideration that is personal,
private, and selfish," and this has been approved by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Price v. Maxwell.2
Briefly stated, although charitable trusts did not exist as
such before the foundation of Courts of Chancery, some-
thing very much like them had existed for a considerable
period. There were a number of existing religious houses
and guilds, and there was the parson of every parish, all per-
sons having perpetual successors, with certain property which
devolved upon them, and certain charitable duties which they
had to perform.' These were all recognized as corporations
at common law, although they showed no authority of con-
stitution. In early times then, charity consisted in gifts to
such corporations, and in the case of lands the Crown con-
sequently lost all the feudal services with respect to the
property so alienated. To prevent this a series of successive
Mortmain Acts were passed. 5 These put a stop to charitable
gifts of land to corporations, but a new method for effecting
them was soon invented. The system had gradually been
adopted of making gifts of land to individuals to the use of
the religious houses, and under these gifts the religious
houses took the profits. A blow was given this system in
the reign of Henry VIII by the Statute ot Uses, which con-
ferred the legal estate on the cestui qui use-i.e., the one who
had the use of the land. The effect of this statute was
destroyed by a decision that the legal title was only con-
ferred on the first person named to have the use, and if he
was further ordered to pass on the beneficial interest to
some one else, the legal estate did not go with it. Chan-
cery, however, compelled the legal owner to allow the bene-
ficial interest to pass as ordered, and the old system was
028 Pa. St. 35. 14ote: But a condition that the donor's name shall
be attached to the gift does not necessarily invalidate it as a charity.
'Tyssen, Charitable Bequests, Chap. I, passim.
'7 Edw. I, C. 2; 13 Edw. I, c. 32; 18 Edw. IU, Stat. 3, c. 3; 15
Rich. IL, c. s.
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thus brought into use again under the name of trusts.'
Under this system gifts could be made to trustees on trust
to apply the income to any purpose the donor saw fit, and
one by one the questions of the validity of such trusts came
before the Court of Chancery for decision. If such trusts
were for the public benefit, the court held them good; in
determining what were in reality charitable trusts the early
judges confined themselves closely to the list of such pur-
poses enumerated in the Statute of Charitable Uses, 43
Eliz. c. 4, but later judges have considered the spirit no
less important than the letter of that act.
The Statute 43 Eliz. c. 4, passed in i6oi, was long re-
garded as limiting the classes of legal charities. It recited
that land, money, and other property had been given for
various charitable purposes, which it enumerated, and au-
thorized the appointment of commissioners to inquire into
such gifts and make orders for their proper application.
The list of charitable purposes contained in it has always
been treated as an expression by the legislature that all
such purposes are lawful charitable purposes, and a guide
to the court in deciding on the legality of other purposes.8
The list enumerated in the statute is as follows:
(I) The relief of aged, impotent, and poor people.
(2) The maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers and
mariners.
(3) The maintenance of schools of learning, free schools,
and scholars in universities.
(4) The repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways,
churches, sea-banks, and highways.
(5) The education and preferment of orphans.
(6) The relief, stock, or maintenance for houses of cor-
rection,
(7) Marriages of poor maids.
(8) The supportation, aid, and help of young tradesrzi-,
handicraftsmen, and persons decayed.
' Tyssen; Charitable Bequests, Chap. I.
'The Statute of Charitable Uses, Anno 43 Elizabethm, C. 4 (x6ox),
entitled '.An Act to redress the misemployment of lazds," etc.
'Tyssen, Charitable Bequests, Chap. IV.
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(9) The relief or redemption of prisoners or captives.
(io) The aid or ease of any poor inhabitants concerning
payment of fifteens, setting out of soldiers, and other taxes.*
The history of the law of charities prior to the Statute 43
Eliz. C. 4 is very obscure. The principal cases reported
at such an early date were decided in the common law
courts, and usually turned upon the question whether the
use were void or not under the statute against superstitious
uses.10  It was never generally doubted that courts of
equity, by virtue of their broad jurisdiction over trusts, and
without reference to the statute, had jurisdiction over clari-
table trusts which presented no unusual features,' but .two
opinions were for a long time held whether the power of
such courts to effectuate charitable donations in favor of
uncertain beneficiaries, or those in whom no legal estate
vested, originated in the statute, or existed prior thereto in
the common law.12
Lord Longborough stated in Attorney-Gen. v. Bowyer"'
that as the result of his study he concluded that until about
the date of the statute of Elizabeth bills were never filed
in Chancery to establish charities, and this opinion was
frequently concurred in by the English courts." One of
the few cases to be found dating from before the statute,
Porter's case,15 established that charitable uses not super-
stitious were good at law, and inasmuch as the Courts of
Chancery immediately afterwards held the feoffees to such
uses accountable in equity for their due execution, it was
not a rash conjecture for later judges to make, says Story;1s
in commenting upon this view, that the inconvenience felt in
resorting to this new and anomalous proceeding, from the
' Tyssen, Charitable Beqnests, Chap. IV.
U2 Story, Eq. Jur. § x43; also Baldwin, J., in the case of Sarah
Zane's will, Cir. Ct. Pa., April Term, 1833.
American and Eng. Enc., 2 Ed, p. 897.
sIdem, p. 898.
333 Ves. Jr. 714, 726
"See Sir Joseph Jekyll, M. R., in Eyre v. Cduntess of Shaftesbury,
2 P. Williams, xig; Lord Somers in Cary v. Bertie, 2 Vern. R. 333
342; Attorney-Ge,. v. BreretoX, 2 Ves. 42, 427.
" i Co. 22b. in 34 and 3s Elizabeth.
n 2Story Eq. Jur. I 1145.
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indefiniteness of some of the uses, gave rise within a very
short time to the statute."
Chief Justice Marshall, in Baptist Association v. Harts
Executors,"8 took the position that the Chancery jurisdic-
tion in effectuating charitable donations originated strictly
in the statute. After an exhaustive review of the early cases,
Marshall concludes that they are all "to be considered as
constructions of the statute, not entirely to be justified,
rather than.as proving the existence of some other prin-
ciple concealed in a dark and remote antiquity, and giving
a rule in cases of charity which forms an exception to the
general principles of our law.19
This view was never universally accepted, and the ques-
tion was reopened in Vidal v. Girard's Executors.2 0 There
it was finally settled. Judge Story, after considering a long
line of authorities 21 and examining the ancient records of
the Court of Chancery, says:
" But what is still more important is the declaration of
Lord Redesdale, a great judge in equity, in Attorney-Gen.
v. Dublin (I Bligh N. S. 312), where he says:
"' We are referred to the statute of Elizabeth with re-
spect to charitable uses as creating a new law upon the
subject of charitable uses. That statute only created a new
jurisdiction; it created no new law. It created a new and
ancillary jurisdiction, a jurisdiction created by commission,
etc.; but the proceedings of that commission were made
subject to appeal to the Lord Chancellor, and he might
reserve or affirm what they had done, or make such order
as he might think fit for reserving the controlling juris-
"There was, in fact, an act passed respecting charitable uses in 39
Elizabeth, c. 9, but it was repealed by Act of 43 Elizabeth, c. 4.
u14 Wheat. z, citing Collison's case, Hob. 136; Attorney-Gen. v.
Platt, Finch, 2; Attorney-Gen. v. Bowyer, 3 Ves. Jr. 726; Morice v.




'Among others, Eyre v. Shaftesbury, 2 P. WIns. 119; Attorney-Gen.
v. Downing, Ambl. 55o; Attorney-Gen. v. Skinners' Co., 2 Russ. 407;
Attorney-Gen. v. Grammar School, x Myl. & K. 376.
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diction of the Court of Chancery as it existed before the
passing of that -statute.' . . . There is the recent case of
the Incorporated Soc. v. Richards, I Dr. & War. 258, when
Lord Chancellor Sugden, .... upon a full survey of. all
the authorities, and where the point was directly before him,
held the same doctrine as Lord Redesdale, and expressly
decided that there is an inherent jurisdiction in equity in
cases of charity, and that charity is one of those objects
for which a court of equity has at all times ifiterfered to
make good that which at law was an illegal or informal gift,
and that cases of charity were valid in courts of equity in
England independent of and previous to the statute of
Elizabeth . . But very strong additional light has been
thrown on this subject by the recent publication of the
commissioners on the public records in England, which con-
tain a very curious and interesting collection of the Chan-
cery records in the reign of Queen Elizabeth and the earlier
reigns. Among these are found many cases in which the
Court of Chancery entertained jurisdiction over charities
long before the statute of 43 Elizabeth . . . They estab-
lish in the most satisfactory and conclusive manner that
cases of charities where there were trustees appointed for
general and indefinite charities, as well as for specific chari-
ties, were familiarly known to, acted upon, and enforced in
the Court of Chancery. In some of these cases, the charities
were not only of an uncertain and indefinite nature, but as
far as we can gather from the imperfect statement in the
printed records they were also cases where there were either
no trustees appointed or the trustees were not competent to
take."
This expression of Justice Story is now regarded as set-
tled law.2 It follows, therefore, that the statute did not
create a new law with respect to charities, but only furnished
a new and ancillary remedial jurisdiction for enforcing
them.
The statute has been variously regarded in the United
"Perin v. Carey, 24 How. 465; Ould v. Washington Hos$itai, 9s
U. S. 3o3; Kain v. Gibboney, ioz U. S. 362.
2o6
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States.23 It has been recognized as part of the common law
in Maine; Massachusetts, Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, and
North Carolina,24 and has been virtually re-enacted in Con-
necticut and Rhode Island. The statute, aside from the
effect of its enumeration of charities, has been rejected in
New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, the District
of Columbia, Indiana, Michigan, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Virginia, West Virginia, Mississippi, and California. The
question of its status has been raised but left undetermined
in Alabama, New Hampshire, and Texas. In Pennsylvania,
Ohio, and Georgia the principles developed under the statute
by the English courts of equity have been approved and
adopted, although those states do not specifically recognize
it as part of their common law. In the remaining states the
question has not been squarely brought before the courts.
The status of the statute in Pennsylvania is perhaps best
expressed in the words of Bell, J., in Wright v. Linn,25 where
the learned judge says: "Though the Statute 43 Elizabeth,
c. 4, relating to charitable uses, has not in terms been recog-
nized as extending to Pennsylvania, we have adopted not
only the principles that properly emanate from it, but, with
perhaps the single exception of cy pres, those which, by an
exceedingly liberal construction, the English courts have en-
grafted upon it. The peculiar qualities commonly ascribed
to its operation are freely administered here wherever our
means are found adequate to the purpose; and in this re-
spect our competency has been much enlarged by the laws
extending the equitable powers of our tribunals."
We now come to a consideration of the purpose to which
the statute is commonly put to-day. It is regarded as a uni-
versal standard or test in deciding what objects are to be
considered charitable, and it is the accepted rule that those
objects only are charitable which are named in the act or are
considered within its spirit.
" American and English Enc., 2d Ed., Vol. V, p. 899, goo; Ouid v.
Washington Hospital, 95 U. S. 303.
, (For cases in all these and following states see Am. and Eng. Enc.,
2d Ed., Vol. V, p. 9o.)
X9 Pa. St 4.
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This was decided in England in Morice v. Bishop of Dur-
ham,26 in which case Grant, M. R., said.: "That word"
(charity) "in its widest sense denotes all the good affections
men ought to bear towards each other; in its most restricted
and common sense, relief of the poor. In neither of these
senses is it employed in this court. Here its signification is
chiefly derived from the statute of Elizabeth. Those pur-
poses are charitable which the statute enumerates or which
by analogies are deemed within its spirit and intendment;
and to some such purpose every bequest to charity generally
shall be applied."
This has been accordingly the view taken by successive
English courts in regard to the question "What constitutes
a charity ?" In Commissioners v. Pemnel 27 Lord Halsbury
said that very shortly after its enactment the Court of Chan-
cery was used to interpret the enumeration of charitable
objects in the preamble of the statute as not limited to the
exact charities therein referred to. Where a purpose was
deemed within the spirit of the act, it was held "charitable,"
and the court alone was the judge of what objects came
within the spirit.
In the United States generally the same liberal view of
the enumeration of charities in the statute has prevailed as
in England. In Pennsylvania this broad view seems gener-
ally to have been taken for granted. Thus, in Wright v.
Linn,28 the court, after showing how the principles of the
statute had been recognized in Pennsylvania, say: "In Wit-
man v. Lex" it is observed, that as the jurisdiction of our
courts is not founded on the statute, it is not restrained to
the cases specially enumerated in the preamble. The same
remark is almost equally true in England. There the equity
of the act has been extended to embrace a large variety of
subjects, by analogy to those enumerated, until the limits of
the circle have swelled far beyond the bounds prescribed by
"9 Ves. Jr. 399; s. c. io Ves. Jr. 5=.
L89T, I. R. App. C. 59x, at p. 543. See also Cumack v. Edwards,
2 CIL (1896) 68s.
9 PaL 433.
s7 S. & R. 88.
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the language of the, enactment. Indeed, it is now asserted
to be merely directory, since, as is said, the jurisdiction ex-
isted long before. The fashion has everywhere been to
enlarge, but never to circumscribe, the operation of the stat-
ute. It therefore furnishes in both countries an unerring
test of the character to be ascribed to those objects and sub-
jects of which it specially speaks."
Sharswood, J., said in Mann v. Mullin: 0 "The founda-
tion upon which the doctrine of charitable uses rests in this
state is firmly settled. While the statute of Elizabeth is not
in force, the principles which the English Chancery has
adopted on the subject obtain here, not by virtue of the stat-
ute, but as part of our common law. The fact is that those
principles were recognized and applied in England before
the statute, which only introduced a new remedy. Hence,
trusts for charities with us have always beeen upheld and
enforced, no matter how uncertain were the objects and
though the effect evidently was to create a perpetuity."
The question of a strict or loose construction has come
before few of our courts for determination. It arose in an
early case in Massachusetts, Sanderson v. White,81 where
Shaw, C. J., stated that ever since the passage of the act of
43 Elizabeth, c. 4, it had been an established rule that all
gifts are to be deered charitable which are enumerated in
that statute as such, and none other.
But in 1865 the Massachusetts court took an entirely dif-
ferent view of the statute in the case of Drury v. Natick,
32
in which they held that it was not meant to contain an ex-
haustive list of all objects that are charitable, but rather a
number of familiar examples of those kinds of uses which
were felt to be of sufficient advantage to the general public-
to deserve especial favor from the courts.33 The aim of the
statute is " to show by familiar examples what classes or
kinds of uses were considered charitable or so beneficial to
=84 Pa. 297.8Z 18 Pick (Mass.), 3
a io Allen (Mass.), x6.
" Notes on the Law of Charity Trusts in Massachusetts, by J. Noble,
p. 27, n. x.
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the public as to be entitled to the same protection as strictly
charitable uses, rather than to enumerate or specify all the
purposes which would fall within the scope and intent of the
statutes, much less every possible mode of carrying them
out." In determining what uses are charitable within the
statute, " Courts are to be guided not by its letter, but by its
manifest spirit and reason, and are to consider not what
uses are within its words, but what are embraced in its mean-
ing and purpose.""'
Continuing, the same court said: "The apparently incon-
sistent statement of Chief Justice Shaw in Sanderson v.
White, that all gifts are to be deemed charitable which are
enumerated in that statute as such, and none other, is shown
by referring to the case of Morice v. Bishop of Durham, xo
Vesey, 521, which he cites in its support, to have omitted,
either by accident or as immaterial to the case then under
consideration, the words added by Sir William Grant, 'Or
which by analogies are deemed within its spirit and intend-
ment.' " 85
Similarly, Devens, J., in White v. Ditson 3' has said:
"The word charitable has a distinct legal meaning derived
from the statute of 43 Elizabeth, c. 4, from the construction
given to it in the definition of its objects of charity and from
the application of the statute to other uses which are not
included in those there enumerated, but which come within
its spirit by analogy."
The same principle holds good in Illinois. "It is true," the
Court there said in Taylor v. Keep,37 that many purposes
not enumerated in the statute have been held to be charitable
on the ground that though not within the letter, they are
within the spirit, intention, and principle. On the other
hand, many objects of a general nature, though laudable and
beneficent in their character and of general utility, are held
not to be included within the legal definition of charity."
In New Jersey the law was clearly stated in Norris v.
"Druvy v. Natick, io Allen (Mass.), x69.
Ibid., p. 182.
140 Mass. 351.
2 IlL App. 36&
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Thomson's Executors."3 The chancellor, in summing up the
situation, stated: " On the equity of this statute" (43 Eliza-
beth) " and the rights established by it, that court" (the
English Chancery) "took jurisdiction of all charities or
subjects included within it. Many of them, as the maintain-
ing of bridges, causeways, and houses of correction, were
neither charitable nor religious objects in the usual sense of
these terms. Yet in proceedings by bill and in information,
instituted in that court, and not in any way under the pro-
visions of the act, the Court of Chancery has always defined
charitable and religious objects according to the enumeration
in the preamble of that act; not limiting the objects.by the
terms of the act literally, but limiting them to matters of like
nature.
"That statute is not in force in this state, and therefore
cannot limit the authority of this court to enforce charitable
gifts not included within it. It was not used for that pur-
pose by the English equity courts, but it was used by them
to enlarge their power. The rule of law and in equity before
that statute was, that a gift or devise for a purpose or object
so vague and indefinite that the Court of Chancery could not
enforce it, was void. After the statute of charitable uses, the
court held that all gifts, for any object enumerated in it were
for purposes sufficiently definite, and therefore would be en-
forced in Chancery. In cases where the object of the gift
would not have been held sufficiently definite without the
statute and have since been held sufficient by force of the
statute, the authority of the decision might perhaps be ques-
tioned on the ground that the statute is not in force here.
But where, on the other -hand, the English courts have held
the object too indefinite, and the use therefore void notwith-
standing the statute, their decisions are entitled to the same
respect here as in all other cases in which we take them for
our guide. The object of the statute of Elizabeth was not
to make void or restrain, but to give effect to gifts for chari-
table and pious uses."
The most important act of legislation in Pennsylvania
U ig N. J. Eq. 307.
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dealing with charities is that of April 26, x8'5, P. L. 328.
Its provisions do not in any way define the term "charity,"
and consequently we find little within it to aid us in our pres-
ent inquiry. Paragraph 15 of the act states that "all dis-
positions of property hereafter made to religious, charitable,
literary, or scientific uses, and all incorporations or asso-
ciations formed for such objects, shall be taken to have been
made and formed under and in subordination to all the duties
and requisitions of this act, as rules of property and laws
for their government." The w9rds religious and charitable
uses in the foregoing provision have been broadly held to
mean legal acts done for the promotion of piety among men
or for the purpose of relieving their sufferings, enlightening
their ignorance, and bettering their condition.' s
Using the enumerated objects of the statute of Elizabeth
as a basis, it will now be clear that both the English and
American courts allow themselves the utmost freedom within
precedents in determining what are and are not charities.
The statute undeniably crystallized what had before been
a subject of the greatest vagueness; it is still the lodestone
to which modern courts submit the cases coming under their
consideration, but its decision is no longer final, -and merely
indicates the general road our later courts must travel.
Rupert Sargent Holland.
'Miller v. Porter, 53 Pa. 292.
